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COMMENT 
STATE AND LOCAL LEGISLATIVE POWERS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT AND 
PREEMPTION DOCTRINES 
IN MARYLAND 
As local legislative powers expand, the demarcation between 
state and local legislative powers has become increasingly 
unclear. Purported inconsistencies between state and local 
laws have surfaced. This Comment analyzes the conflict and 
preemption doctrines in Maryland and synthesizes the 
general rules applicable to these doctrines. Concluding that 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland utilizes a rational 
approach in this area of municipal law, the author urges 
caution in employing implied preemption. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As local governments exercise greater and more diverse powers, 
the boundaries between state and local legislative powers have 
become increasingly uncertain. Local laws may conflict with, or be 
preempted by, laws enacted by the state legislature. This Comment 
examines the express and implied legislative powers granted to 
Maryland chartered counties by Article 25A of the Maryland 
Annotated Code,l including recent interpretations of Article 25A by 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland that have expanded the legislative 
powers of chartered counties. This Comment then focuses on the 
conflict and preemption doctrines as applied by the court of appeals 
to state and local legislation in Maryland. 
The charter2 is the foundation of many local governments. 
Charters can be created either (1) by an act of the state legislature, or 
(2) by constitutional authority, independent of any act by the state 
legislature, whereby the voters petition and later adopt a charter.3 A 
charter adopted pursuant to a state constitutional provision is 
referred to as a "home rule" charter.4 Article XI-A of the Maryland 
Constitution5 sets forth two procedures by which a Maryland county 
1. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5 (1973). 
2. A "charter" is a legislative or consititutional grant of power to a local 
governmental entity, including both cities and counties. 1 E. YOKLEY, 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 38 (1956). 
3. 2 E. MCQUILUN, THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 9.07 (3d ed. 1966) 
[hereinafter cited as MCQUILUN]. 
4. 1 E. YOKLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 38 (1956). Some constitutional 
provisions require the state legislature to "approve" the charter after its adoption 
by the voters. See generally 4 C. ANTIEAU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw § 31.05 
(1966); 56 AM. JUR.2d Municipal Corporations § 126 (1971). 
5. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, §§ I, 1A. Formation of a chartered county can be 
accomplished when a prescribed number of county voters sign a petition 
requesting the election of a charter board. Alternatively, the county commission-
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can become chartered and thereafter exercise home rule.6 A charter 
adopted pursuant to Article XI-A automatically becomes law,7 and a 
chartered county has the full power to enact local laws subject to the 
Maryland Constitution and public general laws.8 
II. LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF A CHARTERED COUNTY 
A. Express Legislative Powers 
By a constitutional mandate,9 chartered counties in Maryland 
may exercise all express powers granted to them by the General 
Assembly.lO Chartered counties are granted enumerated express 
powersll by Article 25A, which is referred to as the Express Powers 
Act. 12 The Express Powers Act confers a wide range of express 
powers on Maryland chartered counties, e.g., to acquire, hold, and 
dispose of county property, to establish county institutions, to 
ers may appoint a charter board and subsequently call an election. Should a 
charter board be elected, it prepares a "charter or form of government." 
Following publication of the draft charter in newspapers of general circulation in 
the county, it is submitted to county voters for adoption. 
6. Maryland counties that have adopted a charter pursuant to Article XI·A include 
the following: Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Harford, Howard, Montgomery, Prince 
George's, Talbot, and Wicomico. Baltimore City is included within the provisions 
of Article XI·A and has also adopted a charter. 
Maryland counties may also adopt home rule under the "code procedure," 
although the powers granted to code counties are less than those granted to 
chartered counties. See generally MD. CONST. art. XI-F; MD. ANN. CODE art. 25B 
(1973); Moser, County Home Rule - Sharing The State's Legislative Power With 
Maryland Counties, 28 MD. L. REV. 327 (1968). For information concerning home 
rule cities, towns and villages in Maryland, see generally MD. CONST. art. XI-E; 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A (1973). For information concerning municipal home rule 
in other jurisdictions, see generally Brown, Home Rule In Massachusetts: 
Municipal Freedom and Legislative Control, 58 MASS. L.Q. 29 (1973); Howard, 
Home Rule in Georgia: An Analysis of State and Local Power, 9 GA. L. REV. 757 
(1975); Scheidler, Implementation of Constitutional Home Rule in Iowa, 22 
DRAKE L. REV. 294 (1973); Vaubel, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio, 3 OHIO 
N.U.I.L. REV. 1 (1975); 5 CREIGHTON L. REV. 98 (1971); 81 DICK. L. REV. 265 
(1977); 41 Mo. L. REV. 49 (1976); 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 736 (1971); 16 WASHBURN 
L.J. 360 (1977). 
7. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 1. The intent of Article XI-A is that "any new charter 
shall go into effect promptly after its ratification by the people." County 
Comm'rs for Montgomery County v. Supervisor of Elections of Montgomery 
County, 192 Md. 196, 209-10, 63 A2d 735, 741 (1949). The charter "is entitled to 
the presumption of validity that is applicable to any law regularly adopted." Id. 
at 207, 63 A.2d at 740. 
8. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 3. A public general law is a law enacted by the General 
Assembly applicable to two or more geographic subdivisions (counties) in the 
state. See MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 4. For judicial definitions of "general law," see 
generally 2 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, at § 4.44. 
9. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 2. 
10. The legislative power is based upon the statutory grant and "is not and never 
has been constitutionally secured." Ritchmount Partnership v. Board of Sup'rs of 
Elections for Anne Arundel County, 283 Md. 48, 58, 388 A2d 523, 530 (1978). 
11. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 4 (1973). 
12. County Comm'rs for Montgomery County v. Supervisors of Elections of 
Montgomery County, 192 Md. 196, 204, 63 A.2d 735, 739 (1949). 
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contract, to zone and plan, to waive its sovereign immunity, and to 
levy taxes. 13 One of the most important express powers is the power 
to "enact local laws for [the] county, including the power to repeal or 
amend local laws ... enacted by the General Assembly upon the 
matters covered by the express powers. . . ."14 Although a chartered 
county is given "full power" to enact local laws,15 it is prohibited 
from enacting laws or regulations for any incorporated town, village, 
or municipality.l6 
The General Assembly is prohibited from enacting a public local 
law17 on any subject covered by the enumerated express powers 
granted to chartered counties. IS The express powers may be 
"extended, modified, amended or repealed" by the General Assem· 
bly,19 but not by a public local law. In State v. Stewart,'liJ the court of 
appeals extensively discussed the rationale for this prohibition: 
If the General Assembly, in its grant of powers to [chartered 
counties], subsequently concludes that the grant of powers 
contained a subject upon which the General Assembly 
should have authority to legislate, and not the [county] 
authorities, it can only accomplish this by amending or 
repealing the act granting and delineating the powers. The 
Legislature has the power to describe the field within which 
the local authorities may legislate, but, having once done 
this, it cannot restrict or limit this field of legislation. . . so 
long as the grant of powers remain[s] unchanged. Any other 
interpretation would render the provisions of article llA 
meaningless, and result in nullifying the purpose sought to 
be accomplished by its adoption. If the Legislature could 
change the grant of power by the simple expedient of 
··13. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, §§ 5(A)-5(CC) (1973 & Supp. 1978) .. 
14. Chartered counties are vested with the power 
[t]o enact local laws for such county, including the power to repeal or 
amend local laws thereof enacted by the General Assembly upon the 
matters covered by the express powers in this article granted; to provide 
for the enforcement of all ordinances, resolutions, bylaws and regula· 
tions adopted under the authority of this article by fines, penalties and 
imprisonment, enforceable according to law as may be prescribed, but no 
such fine or penalty shall exceed $1,000.00 for any offense or 
imprisonment for more than six months. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(A) (1973). 
15. For the purposes of this Comment, a local law is defined as legislation enacted 
by the legislative body of a chartered county, known as the "county council." 
Other definitions are discussed in 2 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, at § 4.48. 
16. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 3. . 
17. A public local law is a law enacted by the General Assembly applicable to only 
one geographic subdivision (county) in the state. See MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 4. 
18. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 4. See generally 2 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, at 
§§ 4.28-4.29; 56 AM. JUR.2d Municipal Corporations § 128 (1971). 
19. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 2. See generally 6 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, at § 21.28. 
20. 152 Md. 419, 137 A. 39 (1927). 
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passing an act in conflict with the legislation of local 
authorities, it would result in the complete frustration of the 
object of the amendment. 21 
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Although the General Assembly is prohibited from enacting public 
local laws inconsistent with the express powers, it may enact public 
general laws inconsistent with those powers.22 
B. Implied Legislative Powers 
Chartered counties are granted a wide. range of enumerated 
express powers; the broadest authority for local legislation exists in 
section 5(S) of Article 25A,23 known as a general welfare clause. 24 
Section 5(S) confers the following additional power on chartered 
counties: 
The foregoing or other enumeration of powers in this 
article shall not be held to limit the power of the county 
council, in addition thereto, to pass all ordinances, resolu-
tions or bylaws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
article or the laws of the State, as may be proper in 
executing and enforcing any of the powers enumerated in 
21. [d. at 424, 137 A. at 41-42. See generally 6 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, at § 21.33. 
22. The court of appeals in State's Attorney of Baltimore City v. City of Baltimore, 
274 Md. 597, 337 A.2d 92 (1975), recognized this power to enact public general 
laws inconsistent with the express powers of chartered counties: 
Under Art. XI·A, § 4, of the Maryland Constitution, the General 
Assembly may enact legislation inconsistent with the express powers it 
had previously granted to Baltimore City or to the charter counties if it 
does so by public general law. The restriction upon the authority of the 
General Assembly in § 4 of Art. XI·A relates to the enactment of public 
local laws only. 
[d. at 606, 337 A.2d at 98 (emphasis in original). 
There is no cogent reason to differentiate between public general and public 
local laws that are inconsistent with the express powers granted to chartered 
counties. While it is true that Article XI·A, § 4 only prohibits the General 
Assembly from enacting public local laws on matters covered by the grant of 
express powers, a public general law should not be any more inconsistent with 
the express powers than a public local law. The primary source of a chartered 
county's legislative powers is Article 25A. Uncertainty as to legislative power 
necessarily results when Article 25A appears to grant a particular power and a 
public general law, on the other hand, removes such power because of 
inconsistency. As indicated in State v. Stewart, 152 Md. 419, 137 A. 39 (1927), the 
General Assembly should amend Article 25A in any case where the express 
powers are to be altered, modified or rescinded. 
For a discussion as to local legislation masquerading as a "general law," see 
Moser, County Home Rule - Sharing The State's Legislative Power With 
Maryland Counties, 28 MD. L. REV. 327, 342 (1968). 
23. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(S) (1973). 
24. Montgomery Citizens League v. Greenhalgh, 253 Md. 151, 161,252 A.2d 242,247 
(1969). A general welfare clause is "[aJ grant of power to pass laws for the peace, 
good government, health and welfare of the community." [d. See generally 2 
MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, at § 10.24. 
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this section or elsewhere in this article, as well as such 
ordinances as may be deemed expedient in maintaining the 
peace, good government, health and welfare of the county.25 
Section 5(S), although listed among the enumerated express powers, 
can be considered an implied power because the language used is 
general and broad, and does not grant power to chartered counties 
over a particular topic or in a particular field, as do other 
enumerated express powers in Article 25A. 
The court of appeals, in the landmark 1969 case of Montgomery 
Citizens League v. Greenhalgh,26 examined the previously unrecog-
nized grant of power in section 5(S).27 The court determined that the 
purpose behind home rule required a broad interpretation of that 
section.28 The court implicitly rejected "Dillon's Rule,"29 which 
narrowly construes grants of power to municipalities, and concluded 
25. MD. ANN. CODE arl. 25A, § 5(8) (1973). 
26. 253 Md. 151, 252 A.2d 242 (1969). In Greenhalgh, the Montgomery County 
Council enacted an ordinance that prohibited discrimination on the basis of 
color, religious creed, ancestry, or national origin in the sale or rental of housing. 
The ordinance was challenged on the ground that the legislative powers granted 
to the county by Arlicle 25A did not embrace the power to pass a fair housing 
law. 
27. 8ection 5(8) is inconspicuously listed under the title "Amendment of County 
Charler." 
28. The courl stated in this regard: 
Gratification would not be afforded the purposes of home rule or the 
reasons which prompted it if the language of § 5(8) of Art. 25A were not 
to be construed as a broad grant of power to legislate on matters not 
specifically enumerated in Art. 25A and the language of that section 
clearly indicates that such a construction is sound. 
253 Md. at 160-61, 252 A.2d at 247. 
29. Dillon's Rule narrowly interprets the powers of a municipal corporation: 
[A] municipal corporation possesses, and can exercise, the following 
powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words: second, 
those necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly 
granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the 
corporation - not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, 
reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the 
courls against the corporation, and the power is denied. 
J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 (1872) (emphasis in original). The 
courl of appeals adopted a broad interpretation of § 5(8) because it is a "general 
welfare clause" and this type of clause is usually subject to a broad 
interpretation. Compare 6 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, at §§ 24.43-.45 with 4 C. 
ANTIEAU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 31.06 (1966). In this regard, the courl 
found application of Dillon's Rule inconsistent with the language of § 5(8): 
[A] number of courts have taken the view that a general grant of power 
to a municipal corporation authorizes only the carrying out of the 
specific powers delegated to it, but even if it be assumed that such a 
point of view is sound in the abstract the language of § 5(8) negates the 
idea that this was its intent, for not only does it empower legislative 
action designed to carry out, exercise and implement enumerated powers, 
it goes furlher to add that power is given "as well" to ordain for the 
maintenance of peace, good government, health and welfare of the 
County. 
253 Md. at 161, 252 A.2d at 247. 
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that "[t]he broadest grant of powers customarily is to home rule 
Counties, . . . and cases holding that a delegation was restricted or 
narrow are concerned almost always with delegations to municipali-
ties that do not enjoy home rule."30 
This broad interpretation of section 5(8) is sufficient to sustain a 
variety of local laws. For example, the court of appeals in County 
Council for Montgomery County v. Investors Funding Corp.3l upheld 
a county ordinance regulating the apartment rental business and 
landlord-tenant relationships: 
Our recognition in Greenhalgh of the expansive nature 
of the legislative powers conferred upon the Council by 
Article 25A, § 5(8), coupled with our holding that, pursuant 
to such power, the Council could enact a fair housing law 
prohibiting racial and religious discrimination in the sale or 
rental of housing in the County is, we think, clear authority 
for the lower court's ruling that the Council was empowered 
to enact local legislation regulatory of the apartment rental 
business and landlord-tenant relationships in Montgomery 
County.32 
Greenhalgh's characterization of section 5(8), together with the 
holding in Investors Funding, indicated that section 5(8) was 
tantamount to the police power, or was at least indistinguishable 
from it; subsequently, the court expressly stated that section 5(8) is a 
grant of police powers to chartered counties.33 
8ection 5(8), as a police power or general welfare clause, 
furnishes a basis for upholding local laws regarding the regulation 
of private businesses,34 including taxicab stands,35 and rents and 
housing.36 Although an early case appeared to be authority for the 
proposition that 8unday closing laws were within the power granted 
30. 253 Md. at 162, 252 A.2d at 247. The majority in Greenhalgh upheld the 
ordinance, stating that "[a] fair housing or equal accommodation law currently 
must prima facie be regarded as a reasonable exercise in good faith of the police 
power to protect the peace and good order of the community and to promote its 
welfare and good govenment." Id. 
Judge Barnes dissented, arguing that the power to pass an anti-
discrimination ordinance was not explicitly enumerated in Article 25A, § 5. He 
concluded that § 5(8) was distinguishable from "the full grant of the State's 
police power as was given to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore by the 
General Assembly .... " 253 Md. at 176, 252 A.2d at 255 (emphasis in original). 
31. 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973). 
32. Id. at 415, 312 A.2d at 232 (citations omitted). 
33. See Prince George's County v. Chillum-Adelphi Fire Dep't, Inc., 275 Md. 374,382, 
340 A.2d 265, 270 (1965). 
34. See id. 
35. C{. G.!. Veterans' Taxicab Ass'n v. Yellow Cab Co., 192 Md. 551, 65 A.2d 173 
(1949) (police power contained in Baltimore City Charter). 
36. Cf. Heubeck v. City of Baltimore, 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99 (1954) (police power 
contained in Baltimore City Charter). 
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to Baltimore City,37 the court of appeals has recently held that the 
power to regulate Sunday closings was not within the power 
delegated to chartered counties by section 5(S).38 
An additional implied power conferred upon chartered counties 
is the power to alter the common law. The court of appeals in County 
Council for Montgomery County v. Investors Funding Corp.39 stated 
that "implicit within the grant of 'full power' to chartered counties 
contained in § 3 of Article XI-A"40 is the power to alter, revise or 
amend the English common law within the matters covered by 
Article 25A's express powers. The court reasoned that the underlying 
purpose of Article XI-A is to share the General Assembly's 
legislative powers with chartered counties. The court noted that the 
English common law "undoubtedly impinges on many areas ... 
recognized by the Express Powers Act as proper subjects of local 
legislation."41 Therefore, the court concluded, if chartered counties 
possess the power to enact local legislation, but lack any power to 
revise the common law, then "local legislation which necessitate[s] 
any revision of the common law would be impossible."42 
III. PUBLIC GENERAL LAWS AND LOCAL LAWS: THE 
CONFLICT AND PREEMPTION DOCTRINES 
A. The Conflict Doctrine 
Article XI-A, also known as the Home Rule Amendment,43 was 
ratified in 1915 and exclusively confines the power to pass local 
laws44 to local authorities, prohibiting its further exercise by the 
General Assembly.45 Mter adoption of its charter, a chartered county 
is entitled to exercise the express and implied powers granted by 
Article 25A.46 The ability of local authorities in Maryland to legislate 
in an area concurrently with the General Assembly is derived from 
Rossberg v. State,47 which was decided prior to ratification of Article 
37. See Ness v. Ennis, 162 Md. 529, 160 A. 8 (1932). 
38. Steimel v. Board of Election Sup'rs of Prince George's County, 278 Md. 1, 357 
A.2d 386 (1976). The court reasoned in Steimel that the long history of Sunday 
closing legislation enacted by the General Assembly on a public local law basis 
and the absence of such legislation by local authorities indicated the General 
Assembly's intent not to grant legislative power in the field to chartered 
counties. 
39. 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973). 
40. Id. at 418, 312 A.2d at 234. 
41. Id. at 418, 312 A.2d at 233. 
42. Id. at 418, 312 A.2d at 234. 
43. State v. Stewart, 152 Md. 419, 422, 137 A. 39, 41 (1927). 
44. For the definition of "local law," see note 16 supra. 
45. Schneider v. Lansdale, 191 Md. 317, 326, 61 A.2d 671, 675 (1948). See generally 2 
MCQUILUN, supra note 3, at § 9.08. 
46. See generally Part II supra. 
47. 111 Md. 394, 74 A. 581 (1909). See generally 6 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, at 
§ 21.32. 
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XI-A. In Rossberg a public general law prohibited the sale of cocaine, 
whereas a Baltimore City ordinance prohibited possession as well 
and, in addition, imposed more stringent penalties. Upholding the 
local law, the court of appeals established the concurrent power 
doctrine. According to the doctrine, if a municipality is granted a 
particular legislative power, then that power may be exercised 
concurrently with the General Assembly.48 
When a chartered county exercises its concurrent legislative 
powers, the possibility arises that local legislation may be inconsist-
ent with public general laws49 enacted by the General Assembly. 
Inconsistency which amounts to conflict may cause the court of 
appeals to invalidate the local legislation. Any conflict between a 
public general law and a public locallauf'O is resolved in favor of the 
public locallaw.51 Any conflict between a public general law and a 
local law,52 however, is resolved in favor of the public general law: 
All . . . local laws enacted by . . . the Council of the 
Counties ..., shall be subject to the same rules of 
interpretation as those now applicable to the Public Local 
Laws of this State, except that in case of any conflict 
between [the] local law and any Public General Law now or 
hereafter enacted the Public General Law shall control.53 
Although statement of the general rule in Article XI-A causes little 
dissension, controversies usually arise as to the definition of 
"conflict" and application of that definition to particular public 
general laws and local laws. Provided there is no conflict within the 
meaning of Article XI-A, local legislation may be sustained even 
though it regulates the same object as does a public general law. 
Although Article XI-A does not define "conflict," the court of 
appeals in Rossberg enunciated a general rule to determine when 
conflict in fact exists: 
[FJurther and additional penalties may be imposed by 
ordinance, without creating inconsistency. The true doctrine, 
in our opinion, is concisely stated . . . as follows: '[local 
laws] must not directly or indirectly contravene the general 
48. The court laid the basis for the concurrent power doctrine: "[i]t follows from what 
we have thus far said that municipal authorities may be given concurrent power 
with the state to punish certain classes of offenses." 111 Md. at 415-16,74 A. at 
584. 
49. For the definition of a "public general law," see note 8 supra. 
50. For the definition of a "public local law," see note 17 supra. 
51. MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 13 (1976). 
52. For the definition of "local law," see note 15 supra. 
53. MD. CONST. art. XI·A, § 3. See generally 6 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, at § 21.32; 4 
C. ANTIEAU, LoCAL GOVERNMENT LAW §31.05 (1966); 56 AM. JUR.2d Municipal 
Corporations § 374 (1971). 
308 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 8 
law. Hence ordinances which assume directly or indirectly to 
permit acts or occupations which the [public general laws] 
prohibit, or to prohibit acts permitted by [public general law ] 
or constitution, are under the familiar rule for validity of 
ordinances uniformly declared to be null and void. Addi-
tional regulation by the ordinance does not render it void.'54 
While subsequent cases decided under the Rossberg conflict rule may 
appear to be incongruous, there is harmony in the court's decisions. 
An analysis of the conflict rule reveals that there may be two tests, 
which employ different analytical techniques, to determine whether 
a conflict exists between a public general law and a local law. These 
tests may be labeled as the verbal test and the functional test. 
An analysis using the verbal test focuses on the terms and 
coverage of the disputed laws; under the functional test the analysis 
focuses on the functional impact of the local law upon the public 
general law's operation and purposes. Under the verbal test, if the 
language or provisions ofthe local law prohibit conduct permitted by 
the public general law, or if the local law permits conduct prohibited 
by the language or provisions of the public general law, then a 
verbal conflict exists and the local law is invalid. For example, in 
Heubeck v. City of Baltimore,55 a municipal ordinance prohibited 
landlords under certain circumstances from evicting tenants upon 
the expiration of their leases. A public general law, however, 
provided for the eviction of tenants holding over at the expiration of 
their terms. Since the local law prohibited conduct, the eviction of 
holdover tenants, which the public general law permitted, it was in 
verbal conflict and consequently invalid.56 
Unlike the analytical technique employed under the verbal test, 
determination of conflict under the functional test requires an 
analysis of the public general law's function or purpose. If the local 
law is in furtherance of the public general law's function, then the 
local law is valid without regard to any verbal conflict. The first case 
illustrating a functional application of the Rossberg conflict rule was 
State v. Brown.57 In Brown, a public general law required all motor 
vehicles to yield the right of way to other vehicles approaching from 
the right. A local ordinance, however, exempted vehicles such as 
54. 111 Md. at 416-17, 74 A. at 584 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). See 
generally 56 AM. JUR.2d Municipal Corporations § 374 (1971). 
55. 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99 (1954). 
56. Another example of the application of the verbal test is Levering v. Williams, 134 
Md. 48, 106 A. 176 (1919). In Levering, the public general law prohibited all work 
on Sunday; the local ordinance, however, allowed professionals to play sports on 
Sunday. Since the local law permitted conduct that the public general law 
prohibited, it was invalidated pursuant to Rossberg's conflict rule. 
57. 142 Md. 27, 119 A. 684 (1922). 
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ambulances from this requirement. Application of the verbal test 
would have invalidated the ordinance since it permitted an act, the 
failure to yield the right of way, which the public general law 
prohibited. The functional test, on the other hand, explains the 
court's decision to uphold the local law. Presumably, the purpose or 
function of the public general law was to promote traffic safety. The 
local law did not counter this function; in fact, it furthered the 
function of the public general law by exempting only emergency 
vehicles, which necessarily require the right of way.58 
Perhaps the clearest illustration of the functional test taking 
priority over the verbal test under the conflict rule is City of 
Baltimore u. Sitnick. 59 In Sitnick, a local law was enacted to 
establish minimum wages. Subsequently, the General Assembly 
enacted a public general law that also established minimum wages. 
The local law, but not the public general law, applied to taverns. In 
addition, although hotels were included in both laws, the local law 
required a minimum wage of $1.25 per hour, as opposed to the $1.00 
per hour minimum wage mandated by the state law for hotel 
employees. The verbal test would have invalidated the local law 
since it prohibited conduct, payment of less than $1.25 per hour, 
which the public general law permitted. Moreover, although the 
public general law was inapplicable to taverns, the local law 
required payment of a minimum wage to tavern employees. 
The court of appeals upheld the local minimum wage law and 
used language indicating application of the functional test. 60 The 
purpose or function of the public general law was to prohibit the 
payment of substandard wages and to maintain a certain standard 
58. Although the court in Brown appears to have upheld the local law solely upon a 
police power theory, implicit in the decision was an application of the functional 
test: "it was not the purpose of the municipality to derogate in any respect from 
the general rule laid down by the Legislature .... " Id. at 30, 119 A. at 685. 
Other cases illustrate application of the functional test. E.g., American Nat'l 
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Baltimore, 245 Md. 23, 224 A.2d 883 (1966); Eastern 
Tar Prod. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 176 Md. 290, 4 A.2d 462 (1939). The local 
law in American National imposed a tax on savings and loan associations for 
the privilege of doing business within the county. This law, it was argued, 
conflicted with a public general law imposing a franchise tax on such 
associations. Since the function of the public general law was regulatory, and the 
function of the local law was to derive revenue, the court of appeals upheld the 
local law. 
59. 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969). 
60. The court implicitly recognized the functional test: 
It is obvious that the Legislature by retaining the power to modify, 
amend or repeal a provision of a municipal charter and by preserving 
the dominance of a public general law over local ordinances in an area 
where conflict may exist . . . , intended that there be a functional 
interplay between State and local legislation. There have been times 
when this has not lent itself to easy solution, although the existence and 
exercise of "concurrent power" has been recognized with some frequency. 
Id. at 312, 255 A.2d at 380 (citation and footnote omitted). 
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of living. Conditions peculiar to a municipality may justify 
additional local regulation by setting a higher minimum wage.61 The 
local law in Sitnick was enacted by the Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore; presumably, Baltimore City established a higher min-
imum wage to compensate for the higher cost of urban living. The 
local law, therefore, furthered the purpose of the public general law. 
According to the court in Sit nick, unless a public general law 
denies legislative authority in a particular field to chartered 
counties, they may enact "supplemental" local legislation.62 The 
word "supplemental" refers to the ability of chartered counties to· 
legislate in furtherance of a public general law's function. 63 The 
court declared that an exemption created by a public general law 
"amounts to no regulation at all and accordingly leaves the field 
open for regulation at the local level. "64 
Rather than distinguishing between the two different applica-
tions of the conflict rule, the verbal and functional tests,65 the 
Sitnick court redefined the language of the Rossberg conflict rule to 
justify upholding the local law: 
A distillation of the opinions we have cited leaves the 
residual thought that a political subdivision may not 
prohibit what the State by public general law has permitted, 
but it may prohibit what the State has not expressly 
permitted. Stated another way, unless a public general law 
contains an express denial of the right to act by local 
61. See Moser, County Home Rule - Sharing The State's Legislative Power With 
Maryland Counties, 28 MD. L. REV. 327, 350 n.79 (1968). 
62. 254 Md. at 317, 255 A.2d at 382. 
63. According to the court, the absence of state regulation allows local regulation: 
We do not think in this case that the exemption from State regulation, 
unaccompanied by any prohibition against inclusion in local regulation, 
was an affirmative guarantee against local regulation. Furthermore, to 
adopt a contrary rule in this instance would create the anomalous 
situation whereby the City's concurrent power to regulate would become 
operative only in the event that the State set a minimum standard which 
the City would supplement. 
ld. at 324, 255 A.2d at 386. If there is no public general law, the local law is not 
"supplementation" because it does not further a function expressed in state 
legislation. See County Council for Montgomery County v. Investors Funding 
Corp., 270 Md. 403, 420, 312 A.2d 225, 235 (1973), in which the court of appeals 
distinguished Sitnick as follows: 
The situation before us, unlike Sitnick ... does not involve the direct 
conflict inherent in a dual regula,tory scheme, since in the instant case, 
Montgomery County has attempted to comprehensively regulate the 
apartment rental business and landlord-tenant affairs, but the State l.las 
not. The theory of permissible "supplementation" of State law by local 
ordinance is, therefore, inapposite. 
64. 254 Md. at 324, 255 A.2d at 385-86. 
65. Application of the verbal test is often ritualistic and mechanical. E.g., Wholesale 
Laundry Bd. of Trade v. New York State Restaurant Ass'n, 17 App. Div.2d 327, 
234 N.Y.8.2d 862 (1962), aff'd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 998, 189 N.E.2d 623, 239 N.Y.S.2d 
128 (1963). 
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authority, the State's prohibition of certain activity in a field 
does not impliedly guarantee that all other activity shall be 
free from local regulation and in such a situation the same 
field may thus be opened to supplemental local regulation.66 
Although upholding the local law based upon an analysis under the 
functional test, the court redefined the conflict rule in such a way as 
to alter the verbal test. The Rossberg conflict rule invalidated local 
laws if they "prohibit[edJ acts permitted by statute."67 Thus, local 
laws were invalid if they prohibited acts impliedly permitted by 
public general law. Under Sitnick, however, local legislation is valid 
unless it prohibits acts expressly permitted by public general law. 
The court has applied the verbal test after Sitnick's redefinition of 
the Rossberg conflict rule.68 
Only a few general statements can be made about Rossberg and 
its progeny. The Rossberg-Sitnick conflict rule only applies to a 
purported conflict between public general laws and local laws; a 
county charter is considered the same as a locallaw.69 The court of 
appeals has refused to extend the rule to alleged conflicts between 
public general and public local laws. 70 This refusal is mandated by 
the language of Article XI-A, which refers only to "any conflict 
between [aJ local law and any Public General Law."71 Any conflict 
between a public general law and a local law must be direct, not 
inferential, and derived from the very language of the disputed 
66. 254 Md. at 317, 255 A.2d at 382 (emphasis in original). 
67. Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394, 416, 74 A. 581, 584 (1909). 
68. E.g., County Council for Montgomery County v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 
Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973), in which a chartered county's ordinance that 
comprehensively regulated the apartment rental business and landlord-tenant 
relationships was attacked as conflicting with numerous public general laws. 
One provision of the ordinance required execution of leases in duplicate and 
copies given to the tenants; a public general law permitted oral leases. Citing 
Sitnick, the court invalidated the provision because it prohibited an act expressly 
permitted by public general law. 
69. See Wilson v. Board of Sup'rs of Elections of Baltimore City, 273 Md. 296, 328 
A.2d 305 (1974). 
70. See Vermont Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wicomico County, 263 Md. 178,283 A.2d 
384 (1971). The public general law in Vermont Federal provided that unpaid real 
estate taxes constituted a lien on the real estate, while the law was silent as to 
unpaid personal property taxes. A public local law, however, established a lien 
on real estate for both unpaid real and personal property taxes. The court of 
appeals rejected the argument that a fatal conflict existed between the two laws, 
stating that "[iJn the instant case, where both the Public General Law and Public 
Local Law are enactments of the same legislative body, the General Assembly, 
the rationalization that the Public Local Law is legislation of a supplemental 
nature, rather than a conflicting enactment, is all the more persuasive." Id. at 
184, 283 A.2d at 388. 
71. MD. CaNST. art. XI-A, § 3. In addition, the court is also prohibited from doing so 
by MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 13 (1976), which provides that any conflict between a 
public general law and a public local law is resolved in favor of the public local 
law. 
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laws.72 Finally, the court of appeals has avoided the conflict issue 
altogether by using strained statutory construction to uphold local 
laws. 73 
B. The Preemption Doctrine 
In cases involving a purported clash between a public general 
law and a local law, the court of appeals is usually faced with 
arguments based not only upon conflict, but also upon express and 
implied preemption. 74 Although some cases have confused conflict 
and preemption,75 they are distinct concepts. 76 Express preemption 
involves the explicit denial of legislative power over a particular 
subject matter77 and is infrequently applied. Implied preemption, 
however, has been applied with greater frequency in Maryland. 
Implied preemption prohibits local laws in a particular field 78 
72. See County Council for Montgomery County v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 
403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973); American Nat'l Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. City of 
Baltimore, 245 Md. 23, 224 A.2d 883 (1966). But see Board of Appeals of 
Montgomery County v. Marina Apartments, 272 Md. 691, 326 A.2d 734 (1974). 
73. See Wilson v. Board of Sup'rs of Elections of Baltimore City, 273 Md. 296, 328 
A.2d 305 (1974). But see Abbott v. Administrative Hearing Bd., 33 Md. App. 681, 
366 A.2d 756 (1976). A classic example of the court's use of statutory construction 
to avoid the conflict issue is Wilson. The public general law there authorized 
construction of a new sports stadium in Baltimore City; money could be 
borrowed from any governmental entity for this purpose. A proposed Baltimore 
City charter amendment, however, prohibited construction of a new stadium 
within the city with public funds. The local laws prohibited an act, the use of 
public funds, which the public general law expressly permitted, the borrowing of 
money from any governmental entity. Rather than striking the proposed 
amendment under Sitnick, the court of appeals concluded that it only prohibited 
construction of a stadium in the city with city funds. But even this exercise in 
statutory construction failed to remove a fatal conflict; the dissent in Wilson 
cogently argued that the local law prohibited what the public general law 
expressly permitted. 273 Md. at 305, 328 A.2d at 311 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). 
The local law still prohibited an act, the borrowing of Baltimore City funds, 
which the public general law expressly permitted, the borrowing of funds from 
any governmental entity. 
The court of special appeals in Abbott could have used statutory construction 
to harmonize the public general and local laws. This was possible by holding 
that the public general law was qualified by the implicit condition that 
administrative appeals were applicable, if so provided by local law, prior to an 
appeal to the circuit court. See Billig v. State, 157 Md. 185, 145 A. 492 (1929). 
Instead, the court struck the local law as conflicting with the public general law. 
74. See, e.g., County Council for Montgomery County v. Montgomery Ass'n, 274 Md. 
52, 333 A.2d 596 (1975). 
75. See, e.g., Galvan v. Superior Ct. of City and County of San Francisco, 70 Cal. 2d 
851, 452 P.2d 930, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1969). 
76. Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield, 274 Minn. 347, 356,143 N.W.2d 813, 
819 (1966). 
77. See City of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969). 
78. A legislative "field" may be defined as "an area of legislation which includes the 
subject of the local legislation, and is sufficiently logically related so that a court 
or a local legislative body, can detect a patterned approach to the subject." 
Galvan v. Superior Ct. of City and County of San Francisco, 70 Cal. 2d 851, 862, 
452 P.2d 930, 937, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642, 649 (1969). 
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because the court of appeals has inferred an intent on the part of the 
General Assembly to occupy exclusively the field. Implied preemp-
tion has been applied to prohibit local legislation in the fields of 
education and campaign finances in Maryland,79 as well as in other 
states. so 
Although the court of appeals rejected implied preemption 
arguments in a few cases81 without discussion, it was not until City 
of Baltimore v. Sitnick82 that the doctrine was discussed in any 
detail. The city ordinance there was attacked on the two grounds 
that it conflicted with, and was preempted by, the public general 
law. The court sustained the ordinance under the conflict rule. 
Nevertheless, in dictum, the court laid the basis for the implied 
preemption doctrine: 
Before leaving the discussion of the concept of "pre-
emption" in the field by occupation, as contrasted with the 
"concurrent power" theory, we wish it understood that there 
may be times when the legislature may so forcibly express 
its intent to occupy a specific field of regulation that the 
acceptance of the doctrine of pre-emption by occupation is 
compelled .... 83 
The court of appeals first applied the preemption doctrine in 
County Council for Montgomery County v. Montgomery Associa-
tion. 84 The Montgomery County Council had enacted three ordinan-
ces regulating campaign finance practices of political candidates in 
the county. Although the county argued that the ordinances were 
valid under the concurrent power doctrine, they were invalidated 
because the court of appeals found that the field regulating election 
79. E.g., McCarthy v. Board of Educ. of Anne Arundel County, 280 Md. 634, 374 A.2d 
1135 (1977) (education); County Council for Montgomery County v. Montgomery 
Ass'n, 274 Md. 52, 333 A.2d 596 (1975) (regulation of election finances). 
80. E.g., Lancaster v. Municipal Ct. for Beverly Hills, 6 Cal.3d 805, 494 P.2d 681, 100 
Cal. Rptr. 609 (1972) (criminal aspects of sexual activity); Anamizu v. City and 
County of Honolulu, 52 Haw. 550, 481 P.2d 116 (1971) (licensing of electrical 
contractors); People v. Uewellyn, 401 Mich. 314, 257 N.W.2d 902 (1977) (definition 
and prohibition of obscenity); Overlook Terrace Management Corp. v. Rent 
Control Bd. of Town of West New York, 71 N.J. 451, 366 A.2d 321 (1976) (rent 
controls); Robin v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347, 285 N.E.2d 
285, 334 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1972) (abortions and practice of medicine); Wholesale 
Laundry Bd. of Trade v. New York State Restaurant Ass'n, 17 App. Div.2d 327, 
234 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1962), aff'd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 998, 189 N.E.2d 623, 239 N.Y.S.2d 
128 (1963) (minimum wages). 
81. E.g., American Nat'l Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Baltimore, 245 Md. 23,30,224 
A.2d 883, 886 (1966); Heubeck v. City of Baltimore, 205 Md. 203, 207,107 A.2d 99, 
102 (1954). 
82. 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969); see text accompanying notes 59-68. 
83. [d. at 322-23, 255 A.2d at 385. See generally 4 C. ANTIEAU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
LAW § 31.09 (1966). 
84. 274 Md. 52, 333 A.2d 596 (1975), noted in 35 MD. L. REV. 542 (1976). 
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finances was impliedly preempted by occupation.85 There were 
numerous factors influencing the court in Montgomery Association. 
The court considered provisions of the Maryland Constitution that 
vested authority in the General Assembly to regulate the manner of 
holding elections. These provisions, the court concluded, demon-
strated an intent to confine regulation of elections exclusively to the 
General Assembly.H6 In addition, public general laws enacted 
pursuant to the constitutional mandate "contain[ed] provisions 
covering every aspect of the electoral process in Maryland."87 Also 
highly relevant to the court's determination regarding occupation of 
the field were acts passed by the General Assembly providing for 
administrative supervision of elections throughout the state, 
particularly on a localleve1.88 Finally, the possible chaos engendered 
by a dual regulatory scheme convinced the court that only public 
general laws were intended to occupy the field.89 
Recently, the court of appeals again applied the preemption 
doctrine in McCarthy v. Board of Education of Anne Arundel 
County.oo There, the court held that the field of education was 
impliedly preempted by occupation of public general laws so as to 
preclude local legislation regarding transportation of children 
attending private schools. The court reviewed constitutional provi-
sions that directed the General Assembly to establish a public school 
system throughout the state. The public general laws enacted 
pursuant to this constitutional directive established and comprehen-
sively implemented a public school system. The court concluded that 
the extensive "legislation by the State in the field of education 
demonstrates the occupation of that field by the State."91 
C. Synthesis 
The various Maryland cases discussing or applying concurrent 
power, conflict and preemption may appear to be incongruous. A 
close analysis of these decisions, however, reveals not only 
consistency but also a rational approach to municipal law in 
Maryland. The general rules applicable to purported inconsistencies 
85. The court reasoned that "[t]he General Assembly has so forcibly expressed its 
intent to occupy the field of regulating election finances that an intent to 
preclude local legislation in that field must be inferred." [d. at 60, 333 A.2d at 
600. 
86. [d. at 60, 333 A.2d at 601. 
87. [d. at 61, 333 A.2d at 601. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. at 64, 333 A.2d at 602. 
90. 280 Md. 634, 374 A.2d 1135 (1977). 
91. [d. at 651, 374 A.2d at 1144. 
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between public general laws and local laws may be synthesized as 
follows: 
1. Exclusive State Concern: Local laws are prohibited when 
their subject matter involves a matter exclusively of state 
concern.92 
2. Concurrent Power: Provided there is sufficient legislative 
power, local laws may regulate a field concurrently with 
public general laws93 unless there is: 
a. Conflict. A conflict between a public general law and a 
local law may take either of the following forms: 
1.) Verbal Conflict: Conflict exists if the language or 
provisions of the local law prohibit conduct permit-
ted by the public general law, or if the local law 
permits conduct prohibited by the language or 
provisions of the public general law;ll4 or 
2.) Functional Conflict: Conflict exists when the local 
law impedes the purpose or function of the public 
general law.95 A local law may be in verbal conflict 
and yet be sustained under the functional test. 96 
b. Preemption: Preemption of a field by a public general 
law so that local laws are prohibited can occur in two 
ways: 
1.) Express Preemption: A public general law contains 
an express denial of the right to enact local laws in 
a particular field;97 or 
92. See County Council for Montgomery County v. Montgomery Ass'n, 274 Md. 52, 
333 A.2d 596 (1975). The court's references to constitutional provisions that 
vested the General Assembly with the responsibility to regulate the manner of 
holding elections may indicate the court's underlying analysis. Although 
purporting to apply implied preemption by occupation, the court appears to have 
concluded that regulation of elections is a matter exclusively of state concern. 
For example, the court stated that "[t]hese constitutional provisions demonstrate 
that the framers of our Constitution contemplated that the regulation of elections 
would be the province of the State Legislature." 274 Md. at 60,333 A.2d at 601. It 
seems the court reasoned through constitutional interpretation that regulation of 
elections is a state matter. The same conclusion could be reached with respect to 
education. See McCarthy v. Board of Education of Anne Arundel County, 280 
Md. 634, 374 A.2d 1135 (1977). 
93. Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394, 74 A. 581 (1909). 
94. The rule is stated in City of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 317, 255 A.2d 376, 
382 (1969) but applied in Heubeck v. City of Baltimore, 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99 
(1954) and Levering v. Williams, 134 Md. 48, 106 A. 176 (1919). 
95. E.g., City of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969); State v. 
Brown, 142 Md. 27, 119 A. 684 (1922). 
96.Id. 
97. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(S) (1973) ("provided, however, that no 
power to legislate shall be given with reference to licensing, regulating, 
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2.) Implied Preemption: A field is extensively occupied 
by public general laws so as to indicate impliedly 
the General Assembly's intent to reserve the field 
exclusively to itself. 98 
3. Exclusive Local Concern: Public general laws are prohibited 
where their subject matter involves a matter exclusively of 
local concern. 99 
The determination of whether a matter is a municipal affair or 
of statewide concern is made through constitutional interpretation 100 
and, thus, this determination is a judicial function. lOl The only 
method to alter such a judicial determination is a subsequent 
reversal of the decision or a constitutional amendment. On the other 
hand, since the conflict and preemption doctrines are matters of 
statutory interpretation, the General Assembly is free to override 
any court decision. For example, an amendment to a public general 
law could expressly preempt a field held by the court to be open for 
"supplemental" local regulation,102 or open a field to local legislation 
if the court were to find it impliedly preempted by occupation. 
Under the Rossberg conflict rule, a local law could not (1) permit 
acts or conduct prohibited by public general law, or (2) prohibit acts 
or conduct permitted by public generallaw. 103 The second prong of 
the Rossberg rule was redefined by the court in Sitnick, which 
concluded that local laws cannot prohibit acts which are expressly 
permitted by public general law. 104 Unless there is an "express 
denial of the right to act by local authorit[ies]," the same field is 
open to "supplementaL local regulation."105 
prohibiting or submitting to local option, the manufacture or sale of malt or 
spirito us liquors"). 
98. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Board of Education of Anne Arundel County, 280 Md. 634, 
374 A.2d 1135 (1977); County Council for Montgomery County v. Montgomery 
Ass'n, 274 Md. 52, 333 A.2d 596 (1975). 
99. Few matters are exclusively of local concern. One example may be the basic 
structure of chartered county government. See Ritchmount Partnership v. Board 
of Sup'rs of Elections for Anne Arundel County, 283 Md. 48, 388 A.2d 523 (1978), 
in which the court of appeals characterized local government in Maryland as 
follows: "it can be seen that the power to establish and organize local 
government springs directly from Article XI·A and thus lies beyond the 
competence of the General Assembly or any other branch of state government to 
alter or erase." Id. at 59, 388 A.2d at 530 (emphasis in original). 
100. See Ritchmount Partnership v. Board of Sup'rs of Elections for Anne Arundel 
County, 283 Md. 48, 388 A.2d 523 (1978). 
101. Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 63, 460 P.2d 137, 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 
469 (1969). The Bishop court stated that "the Legislature is empowered neither to 
determine what constitutes a municipal affair nor to change such an affair into a 
matter of statewide concern." Id. 
102. E.g., City of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 377 (1969). 
103. See text accompanying note 54 supra. 
104. See text accompanying note 66 supra. 
105. Id. . 
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Although Sitnick expanded local legislative power in one 
respect, it also contained the embryo of the preemption doctrine, 106 
which has contracted the legislative power of chartered counties. 
There are two types of preemption, express and implied. Earlier 
cases lO7 only focused on whether the public general law expressly 
denied local legislative power in a particular field or on a given sub-
ject. Utilizing Sitnick's dictum, a second prong of the preemption 
doctrine emerged - implied preemption by occupation. There is very 
little that can be synthesized from the cases espousing this principle. 
The court in County Council for Montgomery County v. 
Montgomery AssociationlO8 considered three factors important in 
determining whether a field was impliedly preempted by public 
general laws. First, constitutional provisions regarding elections 
indicated the framers' intent to confine regulation of elections 
exclusively to the General Assembly. Second, the General Assembly 
had enacted extensive legislation in the field. Third, dual regulatory 
schemes could possibly cause chaos. Only the first two factors were 
present in McCarthy v. Board of Education of Anne Arundel 
County.109 
The court in McCarthy examined constitutional provisions; 
these provisions were a mandate to the General Assembly to 
establish a public school system. In addition, the court reviewed 
extensive legislation enacted by the General Assembly in the field. 
The court was not concerned, though, with a possible dual regulatory 
scheme in McCarthy. This factor, although important in the 
Montgomery Association case, is thus not controlling in the 
preemption doctrine. This is particularly true since the court of 
appeals upheld the local minimum wage ordinance in Sitnick 
notwithstanding a public general law regulating the same field and 
therefore presenting a dual regulatory scheme. 
The first factor considered in Montgomery Association -
constitutional provisions - was also present in McCarthy. The 
implied preemption prong prohibits local legislation because the 
field is already occupied by acts of the General Assembly. 
Constitutional provisions are irrelevant to this consideration and are 
more appropriately directed to an issue of whether the matter is 
exclusively of state or local concern. The only remaining factor pres-
ent in both Montgomery Association and McCarthy is the presence 
of "extensive legislation" by the General Assembly in a particular 
field. Little else can be gleaned from both decisions. McCarthy 
lacked in-depth analysis; it merely reviewed constitutional and 
106. See text accompanying note 83 supra. 
107. E.g., City of Baltimore v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 226 Md. 379, 174 A.2d 153 (1961). 
108. 274 Md. 52, 333 A.2d 596 (1975). 
109. 280 Md. 634, 374 A.2d 1135 (1977). 
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statutory provisions, concluding that extensive legislation in the 
field of education demonstrated implied preemption by occupation. 
Thus, it appears the only guideline the court of appeals offers to 
chartered counties is that "extensive legislation" in a field impliedly 
preempts that field by occupation. 
The doctrine of implied preemption by occupation has been 
addressed in other jurisdictions, notably California. The California 
courts state that the doctrine is premised on the superior authority of 
the statellO and the need to prevent dual regulation that could result 
in uncertainty and confusion. III In addition, the invalidity of a local 
law "arises, not from a conflict of language, but from the inevitable 
conflict of jurisdiction which would result from dual regulations 
covering the same ground."112 
The test used by California courts to determine preemption by 
occupation is whether the state law was "intended" to occupy the 
entire field. 113 Factors to consider in determining an intention to 
confine a field exclusively to state legislation include the following: 
(1) the statutory language;114 
(2) whether the subject matter requires uniform treatment 
throughout the state;115 
(3) whether provisions of the ordinance reveal duplication of 
the state law's function;116 
(4) the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme,ll7 
such as failure of the state law to address various aspects of 
the field, or to use an "all inclusive" phrase,118 and the 
extensive scope of statutory provisions;1l9 
(5) the constant attention given to the subject by the state 
legislature;l20 and 
110. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal.2d 674, 682, 349 P.2d 974, 979, 3 Cal. Rptr. 
158, 163 (1960). 
111. Id. 
112. Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 371, 125 P.2d 482, 485 (1942). 
113. Id. See generally Comment, The California City versus Preemption by 
Implication, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 603 (1966). 
114. Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 371, 125 P.2d 482, 485 (1942). 
115. Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal.2d 708, 713, 249 P.2d 280, 283 (1952). 
116. See Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal.2d 674, 349 P.2d 974, 3 Cal'-Rptr. 158 
(1960). 
117. Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712, 249 P.2d 280, 283 (1952). 
118. In re Hubbard, 62 Cal.2d 119, 126, 396 P.2d 809, 813, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 397 (1964), 
rev'd on other grounds, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969). 
119. See In re Lane, 58 Cal.2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962). 
120. Lancaster v. Municipal Ct. for Beverly Hills Judicial Dist. of Los Angeles 
County, 6 Cal. 3d 805, 808, 494 P.2d 681, 683, 100 Cal. Rptr. 609, 611 (1972). 
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(6) failure of the legislature expressly to allow local legislation 
by statute after a field is held to be impliedly preempted by 
occupation. 121 
The New Jersey courts also state that preemption of a legislative 
field by occupation is a question of the legislature's intent.122 This 
intention must be clearly indicated, however.123 The most important 
factor to New Jersey courts in determining preemption is whether 
the subject matter requires uniform treatment throughout the 
state. 124 Other factors include: (1) the scope of the statute;125 (2) 
presence of a comprehensive state plan;126 (3) legislative history, 127 
and (4) whether the state and local laws have different purposes.128 
California and New Jersey consider similar factors in determin-
ing preemption by occupation, e.g., whether the subject matter 
requires uniform treatment throughout the state, whether the local 
law duplicates the state law's function, and the scope of the state 
statute. The Maryland cases, however, have focused primarily on the 
presence of extensive legislation in a particular field. This "statutory 
nose-count" approach to implied preemption has been severely 
criticized. 129 
121. Id. 
122. E.g., Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761 (1969), in which 
the court stated the test as follows: "whether, upon a survey of all the interests 
involved in the subject, it can be said with confidence that the Legislature 
intended to immobilize the municipalities from dealing with local aspects 
otherwise within their power to act." Id. at 555, 251 A.2d at 764-65. 
123. Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 187, 148 A.2d 473, 478 (1959). 
124. Ringlieb v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 59 N.J. 348, 283 A.2d 97 (1971); 
State v. Ulesky, 54 N.J. 26, 252 A.2d 720 (1969); Kendall Park Chapter of 
Deborah v. City of New Brunswick, 159 N.J. Super. 249, 387 A.2d 1214 (1978); 
Warren Park Estates, Inc. v. Township Comm. of Township of East Windsor, 136 
N.J. Super. 180, 345 A.2d 346 (1975); Dimor, Inc. v. City of Passaic, 122 N.J. 
Super. 296, 300 A.2d 191 (1973); Coast Cigarette Sales, Inc. v. Mayor and City 
Council of Long Branch, 121 N.J. Super. 439, 297 A.2d 599 (1972). 
125. Township of Chester v. Panicucci, 62 N.J. 94, 299 A.2d 385 (1973); Summer v. 
Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761 (1969). 
126. Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 120 N.J. Super. 286, 293 A.2d 720 (1972), 
aff'd, 62 N.J. 521, 303 A.2d 298 (1973). 
127. Borough of Paramus v. Martin Paint Stores, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 595, 298 A.2d 
294 (1972). 
128. Mayor and Township Comm. of South Brunswick Township v. Covino, 142 N.J. 
Super. 493, 362 A.2d 51 (1976). 
129. In Galvan v. Superior Ct. of City and County of San Francisco, 70 Cal.2d 851, 
861, 452 P.2d 930, 937, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642, 649 (1969), the Supreme Court of 
California criticized the statutory nose-count approach: 
To approach the issue of preemption as a quantitative problem 
provides no guidance in determining whether the Legislature intends 
that local units shall not legislate concerning a particular subject, and 
further confounds a meaningful solution to preemption problems by 
offering a superficially attractive rule of preemption that requires only a 
statutory nose-count. 
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The emergence of implied preemption in Maryland poses 
perhaps the greatest threat to the legislative and home rule powers 
of chartered counties. As one commentator has appropriately stated, 
"[i]f an evil-minded judge were to set about to alter the forces of 
local-state governmental relations and strike terror in the hearts of 
iocal legislators, he should probably have arrived at the doctrine of 
implied preemption."l30 The implied preemption by occupation prong 
presents many problems of serious consequence to local legislators. 
First, the situations in which implied preemption by occupation will 
be applied are difficult to ascertain. Implied preemption by 
occupation has been applied in cases where express preemption 
could also be applied. l3l In other situations, the court could have 
invalidated local laws under the Rossberg-Sitnick conflict rule but 
instead foreclosed an entire legislative field as impliedly preempted 
by occupation. l32 Thus, chartered counties lack guidelines as to when 
implied preemption will be applied. Maryland courts are now 
presented with arguments based upon both the Rossberg-Sitnick 
conflict rule and the preemption doctrine. 
Second, implied preemption by occupation presents a serious 
threat to local legislative power. Under this preemption prong, local 
legislation in an entire legislative field is precluded; on the other 
hand, the Rossberg-Sitnick conflict rule only invalidates a particular 
local ordinance that conflicts with a public general law. Even more 
significant is the possibility that chartered counties may be 
precluded from exercising an enumerated express power granted by 
Article 25A. The General Assembly is only prohibited from enacting 
a public local law on any subject covered by the express powers 
granted by Article 25A;133 the General Assembly may enact public 
general laws in a particular field that embraces an Article 25A 
express power. If the court concludes that the field is impliedly 
preempted by occupation, then the General Assembly has altered the 
express powers, in effect repealing an express power, without 
amending Article 25A.134 
Finally, implied preemption by occupation has created a 
guessing game for chartered counties as to their legislative powers. 
Tracing legislation to an enumerated express power, or even the 
130. Feiler, Conflict Between State and Local Enactments - The Doctrine of Implied 
Preemption, 2 URB. LAWYER 398, 398 (1970). 
131. E.g., McCarthy v. Board of Education for Anne Arundel County, 280 Md. 634, 
374 A.2d 1135 (1977). 
132. Compare County Council for Montgomery County v. Montgomery Ass'n, 274 Md. 
52, 333 A.2d 596 (1975) with Abbott v. Administrative Hearing Bd., 33 Md. App. 
681, 366 A.2d 756 (1976). 
133. MD. CONST. art. XI·A, § 4. 
134. But see State v. Stewart, 152 Md. 419, 424, 137 A. 39, 41-42 (1927). See text 
accompanying notes 17-22 supra. 
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general welfare clause, in Article 25A is insufficient to determine 
whether a chartered county has authority to legislate on a given 
subject or in a particular field. It is irrelevant under implied 
preemption whether a chartered county has legislative power to 
enact particular legislation.13s In addition, local legislative power 
could very well expand and contract when a particular field is held 
to be impliedly preempted and the General Assembly later repeals 
public general laws in the field. 
The court of appeals' opinions have failed to provide clear, certain 
guidance as to the method for determining the legislative fields open 
to local legislation. A leading commentator on municipal jurispru-
dence has stated that "[w]hen the legislature does not clearly 
indicate that it is occupying a well-defined field, courts should be 
most reluctant to invalidate county legislation"136 as impliedly 
preempted by occupation. The mere presence of public general laws 
in a particular field should not necessarily deprive a chartered 
county of its legislative power in that field.137 Moreover, the mere 
fact a public general law contains detailed and comprehensive 
regulation of a subject should not alone establish legislative intent to 
occupy the entire field to the exclusion of local legislation.13s 
Implied preemption cases often focus on whether the legislature 
intended to occupy the particular field. Determining intent may be a 
difficult and uncertain process: 
In searching for legislative "intent" to pre-empt a field, 
a court should keep clearly in mind the type of intent it can 
reasonably expect to discover. Surely a legislature does not 
ordinarily intend to invalidate the particular ordinance in 
question; indeed, the ordinance may not have existed at the 
time the statute was passed .. It is unreasonable to expect, 
moreover, that the intent was specific enough to have been 
directed to a particular kind of ordinance. . . . Probably the 
closest approximation of intent possible, in the absence of 
contrary indication in the statute, is that any ordinance 
which substantially interferes with the effective functioning 
of the statute should be invalidated.139 
Implied preemption, although necessary, should be applied infre-
quently and only to those public general laws "which the General 
135. E.g., County Council for Montgomery County v. Montgomery Ass'n, 274 Md. 52, 
333 A.2d 596 (1975). The court found "it unnecessary to decide whether the 
County Council otherwise had the authority to enact the election ordinances" 
once it concluded the field was impliedly preempted by occupation. Id. at 57, 333 
A.2d at 599. 
136.4 C. ANTIEAU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW §31.09 (1966). 
137. See generally 6 MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, at § 9.07. 
138. See note 125 and accompanying text supra. 
139. Note, 72 HARV. L. REV. 737, 745 (1959). 
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Assembly clearly intended to apply uniformly statewide."140 Tll~ 
court of appeals should employ a more comprehensive test in 
determining implied preemption, examining some of the factors used 
by the California and New Jersey courts in their decisions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Consistent with the purpose behind Article XI-A, to provide the 
fullest measure of self-government to chartered counties, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland has rendered opinions broadly interpreting 
local legislative power. For example, in Montgomery Citizens League 
v. Greenhalgh,141 the court effectively rejected Dillon's Rule by 
interpreting Article 25A, section 5(S) as equivalent to the police 
power. In addition, other cases have similarly extended additional 
power to chartered counties, such as County Council for Montgo-
mery County v. Investors Funding Corp.,142 which held that 
chartered counties have the implied power to alter the English 
common law on matters covered by the enumerated express powers. 
Counterbalancing the expansion of local legislative power has 
been the application of the conflict and preemption doctrines. It may 
appear that the additional power conferred upon chartered counties 
resulting from recent interpretations of the Express Powers Act has 
been withdrawn by the application of the conflict and preemption 
doctrines. Certain limitations, however, are necessary on chartered 
county legislative powers, and direction must be given chartered 
counties to avoid confrontations with legitimate legislation enacted 
by the General Assembly. Both the verbal and functional tests of the 
conflict rule serve as useful tools to invalidate local laws; at the same 
time, chartered counties can ascertain, to a reasonable degree of 
certainty, whether a local law will violate either test. Express 
preemption, although easy to determine, has been infrequently used. 
Implied preemption by occupation, on the other hand, has 
emerged in the past few years. Implied preemption, although 
concededly necessary to prohibit local legislation in some fields, 
should be applied only where it is clearly obvious that public general 
laws alone should occupy a field.l 43 Preemption of a field "may often 
be a major policy decision for which the legislature should, if 
possible, assume responsibility."144 Frequent applications of implied 
140. Moser, County Home Rule - Sharing The State's Legislative Power With 
Maryland Counties, 28 MD. L. REV. 327, 349 (1968) (emphasis added). 
141. 253 Md. 151, 252 A.2d 242 (1969). 
142. 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973). 
143. Fields where it is obvious that the General Assembly intends to preempt include 
laws relating to partnerships, trusts, and domestic relations. 
144. Note, 72 HARV. L. REV. 737, 746 (1959). 
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preemption will cause considerable uncertainty in chartered counties 
as to the extent of their legislative powers. The court of appeals, 
therefore, should be most cautious in applying the doctrine of 
implied preemption by occupation. 
J. Scott Smith 
